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Abstract
Electric bills consist of a cost related to the consumed energy and a cost
related to the maximum demanded power. This latter part usually accounts
for approximately 25% to 40% of the bill. Demanded power by big consumers
is measured in real time and electric companies highly penalise them if the
maximum demanded power (along the billing period) exceeds the contracted
power by the consumer. In this paper we propose a new method that, given
the demanded power of close consumers for a time window (power profile),
power costs are reduced by re-allocating the demanded power among con-
sumers in order to keep all of them below or equal to their contracted power.
We also propose and analyse some strategies to set a preference when not
all power profiles can be kept below the contracted power. We tested this
method using real-based simulated power profiles of eight different business
buildings located in Girona and the power cost reduction achieved reached
approximately 20%.
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1. Introduction
Electric companies charge their customers for the amount of energy de-
manded and for the contracted power they have. Contracted power is sup-
posed to be the maximum power at which the electric service will be in-
terrupted (by some physical device) if the power required by the customer
exceeds it. However, the popularisation of maximeters (devices that measure
the maximum demanded power) has brought about electric tariffs that do not
interrupt the electric service. Instead, these meters allow electric companies
to apply maximum-power-dependent prices. For example, electric companies
apply different prices depending on whether the demanded power of the cus-
tomer exceeds the contracted power, or whether it is lower than a particular
percentage of this contracted power.
Power cost is related to the infrastructure costs of electricity distribution
companies. Trading companies use (and pay for) the infrastructure and in
turn charge their customers for providing the required service (providing
energy). As a consequence, trading companies have no margin to decrease the
power cost (they are set by distribution companies), but they are interested in
advising their customers on how they could reduce this part of their electricity
bill.
Usually, maximum-power-dependent pricing is a demand-response strat-
egy used by electricity companies which highly penalises the customer when
it exceeds its contracted power even if it does so for a short period of time.
For this reason we propose a new method called PRA (Power Re-Allocation)
whereby customers consent to be assigned demanded power from others in
order to keep all of them below the contracted power. So customers that do
not use all of their contracted power transfer their surplus to neighbours who
do exceed it. Therefore, power costs are reduced without reducing the sum
of demanded power by all customers; it just re-allocates the demand among
them. We also present some strategies to establish which customers have
priority when not all can be put below the contracted power.
The benefits of using the PRA method compensates from large the in-
vestment required to implement the approach, mainly, individual customers
converted to a single one, in a close distance.
This paper is organised as follows: first we present some work related to
cost reduction to deal with demand response strategies; second we formulate
the problem of minimising power costs under maximum-power-dependent
prices; then we explain our method called PRA; next we present our experi-
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ments and the results obtained; finally we expose the conclusions of the work
and propose some further work.
2. Related Work
A great deal of current literature concerns applications to reduce en-
ergy costs from the System Operator’s (SO) point of view. For example
Mohsenian-Rad et al. [13] present a new approach of demand-side man-
agement (including several consumers) based on game-theoretic energy con-
sumption scheduling under variable prices (time-dependent and volume-de-
pendent). It is a demand-side management approach that assumes that con-
sumers will give their best response to price changes re-scheduling their con-
sumption profile. Also from the SO point of view, Jia et al. [6] establish a
multi-agent system to represent the interactivity between SO and terminal
consumers. The authors propose a continuous analysis on demand response
using strategies that they present, which reflect the interactive response be-
tween the SO and terminal consumers. Faria et al. [3] present an approach
based on particle swarm optimisation to manage demand response on sim-
ulated power systems. Moreover, Ketter et al. [7] describe an energy mar-
ket simulator used to study the dynamics of customer and retailer decision-
making. Our work does not concern the SO but a coalition of customers. In
this sense this paper proposes a methodology to reduce power costs from the
terminal consumer point of view.
The concept of creating coalitions of energy consumers has been also
proposed by Vinyals et al. [17]. They propose that consumers can create
a coalition of consumers through their contacts in a social media network.
The aim of the coalitions is to flatten their aggregated energy consumption
profile and then allow consumers to buy energy together. Our work differs
from Vinyals et al. [17] because we focus on costs related to the maximum
demanded power by the consumer and in doing so consumers of the coalitions
must be close geographically due to power constraints. Furthermore, we
propose a centralised approach to manage coalitions while Vinyals et al.
[17] propose a decentralised approach without a technological solution. In
addition to energy or power issues, Leng et al. [10] analyse space-exchange
problems between retailers. This work shares with our paper the concept of
exchanging a good that is sometimes in excess, without involving monetary
units. However, the application field is completely different and thus, the
features of the problem.
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From consumers’ point of view, Torrent-Fontbona & Lo´pez [16] present
and analyse some approaches of resource allocation for minimising costs un-
der time-dependent and volume-dependent energy prices in a project schedul-
ing problem (assigning energy consuming resources to activities). Simonis &
Hadzic [15] calculate some lower limits for solving the workflow scheduling
problem under time-dependent prices. Our work is complementary to these
demand response applications because we propose that some consumers in
the same zone, that have already scheduled their activities in order to min-
imise energy costs, share their power rights to keep all of them below their
contracted power. Also, from the consumer point of view, there are many
works like Zhang et al. [18] that present methodologies to optimise energy
costs when the consumer has a particular energy generation capacity.
Focusing on the private sector, there are several companies such as Arista
Power (US), MeasurLogic (US), EnerNoc (US) or Circuitor (Spain), that offer
technological solutions for reducing power costs. These solutions are based
on using storage systems and controlling and managing loads (disconnecting
non-critical loads when the consumer surpasses the contracted power). How-
ever, there is not any solution based on making coalitions of consumers and
taking advantage of the different power profiles to reduce power costs as we
propose in this paper.
There are some works that analyse household behaviour regarding energy
consumption and energy prices as Gottwalt et al. [5]; Brounen et al. [2] and
introduce new indexes to measure demand response and models of consumers
[8]. For further literature of demand-side management, Law et al. [9] describe
the key objectives of demand-side management and surveys demand response
architectures.
3. Problem modelling
In recent years the problem of determining the power cost of a customer
has been changed due to the smart grid. The use of maximeters allows elec-
tricity companies to charge consumers for their maximum demanded power
m, along a time window W . However, electricity companies penalise cus-
tomers when m exceeds the contracted power c. For example, in Spain, when
m < 0.85c the electric company charges for 85% of c; when 0.85c ≤ m ≤ 1.05c
the company charges for m; and when m > 1.05c the company charges for
m+ 2 (m− 1.05c). Moreover, electric companies apply different billing peri-
ods that consist of classifying the demanded power according to the time-slot
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Table 1: Notation
t time index
k period index
i customer index
W time length between two bills
Np number of periods
Nc number of customers
ci,k contracted power by customer i for period k
cuk aggregated contracted power of the umbrella entity for period k
αi,k under-power demand parameter
βi,k over-power demand parameter
pi,k,t demanded power by customer i in period k at time t
pi power profile
mi,k maximum demanded power by customer i along period k
muk aggregated maximum demanded power by the umbrella entity
pii,k power price (e/kW) of customer i for period k
τi,k target power of customer i for period k
APRk,t accumulated power rights by all customers in period k and at time t
ADPk,t accumulated demanded power by all customers in period k and at time t
PSk,t power sharing (capacity of all customers to accept power from others) at
time t of period k
priorityi,k priority value of customer i for period k
xi,k amount of time customer i has received power from other in period k
zi,k,t amount of power customer i has received from others at time t of period k
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(time of the day) it is required. In this way, each period represents a partic-
ular part of every day, i.e. from 00:00 to 08:00. Continuing with the Spanish
example, Spanish law says that each day must be divided in three periods,
and therefore, there must be a maximum demanded power for each one.
In the general case, the payment or power costs of a customer can be
formalised according to the following notation.
Customer: i is the customer index (i ∈ [1, Nc]);
Time window: W , time duration between two bills of a set of customers
(usually a month).
Period: k, fraction of a day corresponding to a power tariff; k ∈ [1, Np]; Np
is the number of periods which divide each day;
Slot: t, is the time index in a period; t ∈
[
1, W
Np
]
Contracted power: ci,k, the contracted power that gives the customer i
the rights of demanding up to βi,kci,k (kW) in period k without paying
extra charges. αi,kci,k is the minimum power to pay for.
Under-power demand parameter: αi,k.
Over-power demand parameter: βi,k.
Demanded power: pi,k,t, the demanded power of customer i in period k at
time t.
Power profile: pi = {pi,k,t, ∀k, t}, is the power of any customer i in a given
time window (see for example p1 in Figure 1).
Maximum demanded power: mi,k, the maximum demanded power (kW)
of customer i along all k periods of the time window W . It is calculated
as
mi,k = max
t
(pi,k,t) (1)
It is important to point out that a unique high value of a slot t deter-
mines the maximum power, compromising the power costs of the whole
period.
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Power price: pii,k, the power price (e/kW) for the period k.1
In such a way, the power cost of consumer i for period k can be computed
as follows:
cost(mi,k) =

αi,kci,k · pii,k mi,k < αi,kci,k
mi,k · pii,k αi,kci ≤ mi,k ≤ βi,kci,k
(mi,k + 2 (mi,k − βi,k · ci,k)) · pii,k βi,kci,k < mi,k
(2)
In this scenario, consumers with mi,k < αi,k ·ci,k are paying more than the
power they demand and those with βi,k · ci,k < mi,k are highly penalised for
exceeding their contracted power. Thus, in a given group of customers, those
that do not exceed αi,k · ci,k could be interested in sharing their power rights
with those that do exceed αi,k · ci,k (specially those that exceed βi,k · ci,k).
One day a customer could be on the giving side, when in another it could be
on the receiving side, obtaining mutual benefits over the long term.
Despite our starting point is the Spanish electricity billing, it can be
generalised to other electricity billing based on charging consumers according
to their demand peaks. For example, the power re-allocation problem stated
in this paper is extensible to other countries such as Germany, the United
Kingdom, Austria, Czech Republic, etc. In general, we can say that most
countries use a billing methodology based on the demand of the consumers,
but they differ in the types of consumers (big consumers, special consumers,
small consumers, etc.) they apply these tariffs, the weight of demand charges
on the whole price of the electricity services, the use of time dependent prices,
the division of the billing in periods, etc.
The power re-allocation problem consists of finding the mi,k that min-
imises the consumers costs, that is,
min
i,k
cost(mi,k) (3)
4. Methodology
This paper proposes a method (PRA) to re-allocate demanded power
among customers close to each other, so that they can reduce their power
1Power prices (e/kW) differ from energy consumption prices (e/kWh) which can also
be time-dependent (see [16]) for how to deal with energy consumption).
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costs. In this way, the method consists of re-allocating demanded power
from those customers that exceed αi,k · ci,k, and preferably those that exceed
βi,k ·ci,k, to those customers that do not exceed the minimum power, αi,k ·ci,k.
Figure 1 illustrates power re-allocation between two customers.
In doing so, we propose an umbrella entity which aggregates the de-
manded power of all of its customers and agrees a single contract with the
power company (see Figure 2). Our proposal is that electricity trade com-
panies offer their customers to manage the umbrella entity without an extra
cost for the consumers. Thus, we think they can offer this service to catch
customers thanks to its economic benefits, and we think that they can offer
it free because the cost of running this service is negligible compared to cur-
rent costs of electricity services: collecting consumers power data is carried
out by already (or being) implanted smart meters and an extra smart meter
(300) for the umbrella entity. Furthermore, we think electricity companies
can offer this service free as they are offering currently services to optimise
the contracted power (adjusting it to the consumption).
Regarding the umbrella entity, it internally re-allocates the demanded
power and computes the costs of such demands, which are finally paid to
the distribution company. If the demand peaks do not occur simultaneously,
the total cost would be less than the sum of costs separately. In this sense,
consumers would be able to reduce their aggregated demanded power while
flattening the load of the grid with respect to the contracted power. This
benefits distribution companies because they must provide an infrastructure
able to support these contracted powers and this would avoid having to
increase the infrastructure by using it more efficiently. In this sense, PRA
can be used as a tool for increasing network usage, which is one of the main
drawbacks (poor network usage) of using an electricity billing method based
on demand charge. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the different
agents involved. Note that it is not the same as a microgrid or a virtual
power plant [1; 14].
PRA can also be seen as an incentive for locally smooth the electricity
demand, one of the main objectives for the future smart grid. Smoothing
of the demand conveys a reduction of reserve generators which are usually
active, but disconnected, waiting for covering a peak of demand. Then,
a reduction of the active generators, and even a reduction of the installed
generators may help to decrease the global need of energy and the over-
exploitation of the Earth with its climatic consequences. Thus, PRA can be
added to other activities aimed to smooth and reduce power demand such
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Figure 1: Illustration of how PRA re-allocate the excess of power of some consumers to
others. Here, p1 and p2 represent the original power profiles and p1′ and p2′ represent the
respective power profiles after power re-allocation.
as energy efficiency measures. See Meir & Pearlmutter [11]; Meir et al. [12]
for architectural energy efficiency measures and consequences of the climatic
change.
Next, we describe how the aggregation is carried out in the umbrella en-
tity, and we follow with the re-allocation algorithm descriptions and strate-
gies.
4.1. Umbrella entity
The umbrella entity demands power equal to the sum of the power de-
mands of the consumers behind it. Then this umbrella entity pays the distri-
bution company according to this aggregated demanded power, taking into
account, the maximum demanded power behaviour. On the one hand, it
agrees a power contract for period k, cuk , equal to the sum of the contracted
powers,
cuk =
∑
i
ci,k (4)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the structure of the relationship between the different entities
On the other hand, the maximum demanded power by the umbrella entity,
muk at a given period k is
muk = max
t
{
∑
i
pi,k,t} (5)
Given the under and over power demand parameters for the umbrella
entity, αk and βk, the payment for the umbrella entity is,
cost(muk) =

αkc
u
k · pik muk < αi,kcuk
muk · pii,k αkcuk ≤ muk ≤ βkcuk
(muk + 2 (m
u
k − βk · cuk)) · pii,k βkcuk < muk
(6)
For example, consider an umbrella entity that aggregates the consumption
of two consumers like Figure 3. Both consumers have the same contracted
profile which is registered in three periods (k = 1, . . . , 3), of equal length,
all of them are: ci,1 = 40kW (time slots 1 to 3), c2,2 = 50kW (time slots 4
to 6), and ci,3 = 30kW . The resulting aggregated contracted power for the
umbrella entity is then, cu1 = 80kW, c
u
2 = 100kW, c
u
3 = 60kW . For t = 2, con-
sumer one demands 45kW going above its contracted power (c1,1 = 40kW );
when managing power under the umbrella entity, no consumer exceeds the
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contracted power (cu1 = 80kW ). A similar situation happens for t = 7 and
t = 8. However, for t = 5, the maximum demanded power of consumer three
(60) cannot be flattened to cu2 , although it is somehow diminished. The dif-
ference between mu2 − cu2 (105-100) is shorter than m2,k− c2,k (60-50), and so,
depending on the βk value, the umbrella entity would be penalised or not,
affecting the payment of consumer two. In case of the two consumers have
exceed their allowed peak power at the same time, no re-allocation would
have been carried out.
Regarding the payment, and assuming a power price pii,k = 1 for all i, k,
αi,k = 0.85, and βi,k = 1.05, consumer 1 out of the umbrella entity would
pay, according to Equation 3,
• Period 1: 51e, since 1.05 ∗ 40 = 42.00 < mi,k = 45
• Period 2: 45e, since 0.85 ∗ 50 = 42.50 < mi,k = 45 < 1.05 ∗ 50 = 52.50
• Period 3: 42e, since 1.05 ∗ 30 = 31.50 < mi,k = 35
equalling a total of 138.00 e. On behalf of consumer two, the payment would
be,
• Period 1: 40e, since 0.85 ∗ 40 = 34.00 < mi,k = 40 < 42.00
• Period 2: 75e, since 52.50 < mi,k = 60
• Period 3: 42e, since 31.50 < mi,k = 35
equalling a total amount of 157.00 e. The sum of costs incurred without the
umbrella entity is then 295.00 e. On the other hand, according to Equation
6 and assuming αi,k = αk = 0.85 and βi,k = βk = 1.05, the umbrella entity
would pay the following amounts for each period:
• Period 1: 78e, since 0.85 ∗ 80 = 68.00 < mi,k = 78 < 1.05 ∗ 80 = 84.00
• Period 2: 105e, since 0.85 ∗ 100 = 85.00 < mi,k = 105 < 1.05 ∗ 100 =
105.00
• Period 3: 55e, since 0, 85 ∗ 60 = 51.00 < mi,k = 55 < 1.05 ∗ 60 = 63.00
Totalling the amount of 238.00 e. The benefits are then considerable. The
issue is how these benefits are shared among all the members of the coalition.
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Figure 3: Example of energy consumption aggregation.
Current law forbids the resale of energy or power, thus the re-allocation
of power needs to be done without an exchange of money. This fact limits
the global saving that the community could achieve, i.e. a customer in the
situation αi,kci,k ≤ pi,k,t < βi,kci,k could receive power from another one
where pi,k,t > βi,kci,k in exchange of a payment. The second customer will
be penalised for its high power demand and thus it will be predisposed to
pay, to the first consumer, to avoid these extra charges. However, due to
law issues, we cannot follow this unconstrained coalition approach, and we
constraint our solution to avoid money exchange.
Our proposal assumes agents collaboration, so that in some occasions one
agent would receive power, while in other will give, with a common goal to
reduce all of their costs. Each agent follows Equation 3 to compute their
payment. The umbrella entity reallocates power among agents, so that the
maximum demanded power by each agent mi,k, for all k, is diminished due
to the power exchange, so at the end, all agents have their costs reduced.
Therefore, we guarantee that any consumer will pay less than running alone.
Furthermore, the amount of money the umbrella entity will have to pay will
be equal or lower than the sum of payments each customer would have to
pay if they were running alone.
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4.2. PRA basics
PRA analyses the demanded power in repetitive slot series of the time
window W , and seeks the power profiles that minimise power costs guaran-
teeing that no consumer will pay more than without PRA. The ideal situation
happens when all consumers’ demand is exactly mi,k = αi,kci,k according to
the power costs expressed by Equation 2. If they demand a lower amount,
they will pay the same; if they demand more, they will be penalised with
extra charges.
Given the profiles of a set of customers, pi,k,t∀i, k, t, and their contracted
power ci,k, ∀i, k, PRA computes the new power profiles to minimise their
maximum demanded power (Equation 3), meaning, they are all below αi,kci,k.
To this end, power is shifted from one customer to another in order to keep
each customer below the contracted power.
However, sometimes it is impossible to keep all demanded power at each
slot t below αi,kci,k. In such a situation, when at some slot t a particular con-
sumer has its maximum demanded power mi,k > αi,kci,k and it is impossible
to reduce it, the consumer will have to pay, at least, for this mi,k along all
the period k of the time window W . That means that the consumer is only
consuming the power it demands in a single slot, while in the remaining time
window it is paying for power that is not used. To avoid such a situation,
PRA increases the capacity of the consumer to receive power from others
without increasing the amount of money it will pay.
To model this customer capacity we define the target power of each con-
sumer i for each period k, τi,k, which is initialised to αi,kci,k. When at some
point a particular consumer has its maximum demanded power mi,k > τi,k
and it is impossible to reduce it, PRA sets the target power to this new value
τ ′i,k = mi,k. The consumer will have to pay, at least, for this mi,k but it will
have more capacity to accept demanded power from others.
Summarising, PRA is an iterative process, in which power reallocation
and target power setting is repetitively applied until target powers become
steady (see Figure 4). In our experiments a mean of 4.15 times with a
standard deviation of 7.47 were sufficient in order to find the optimal re-
allocation.
On the other hand, re-allocation of power can be conducted according to
different strategies, responding to a strategic decision of the trading company.
In this work we propose a proportional strategy and two approaches based
on priorities (received frequency and received amount strategies). In the
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Figure 4: PRA iteration process
remainder of this section, we detail the steps of the algorithm, including the
strategies.
4.3. Power re-allocation step
PRA tries to re-allocate power so that all consumers reach their target
power. In doing so it determines that there are two kinds of roles among
consumers:
• Receiver: if mi,k < τi,k. They receive power from other consumers.
• Giver: if mi,k > τi,k. They need to give power to other customers;
otherwise they will pay extra charges due to extra demand.
First of all, it is important to know whether the addition of all the con-
tracted powers is enough to keep every customer below its target power, in a
given time slot k, considering the sum of all the power demanded by them.
In doing this, we assume that the length of the slots reported by all the
customers is the same. Note, however, that considering different time slots
is an easy extension of our method by recursively applying the method with
another scale. Then, we define:
Accumulated Power Rights: APRk,t is the addition of all the contracted
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powers,
APRk,t =
Nc∑
i=1
τi,k (7)
Note that APRk,t is calculated according to τi,k since it tells us the
maximum power that a customer can demand without increasing the
amount of money it has to pay.
Accumulated Demanded Power: ADPk,t is the addition of all the power
demanded by consumers,
ADPk,t =
Nc∑
i=1
pi,k,t (8)
Power Sharing PSk,t as the capacity of all customers to receive power from
others without increasing their individual cost,
PSk,t =
Nc∑
i=1
max (τi,k − pi,k,t, 0) (9)
If there is enough APRk,t, that is, ADPk,t ≤ APRk,t, then, there would
be some power sharing to negotiate. The PSk,t is distributed by all the
receivers according to some strategy.
Otherwise, if there is not enough APRk,t, that is, ADPk,t > APRk,t
there would be some givers that cannot fulfil their target power. In spite of
this, there could be givers and receivers, the latter offering power sharing (if
PSk,t > 0), although not enough to cover all the demand. In this case, the
givers can be classified into two categories:
• Non penalised customers: those who keep their demanded power be-
tween the target power and βi,kci,k (over-power demand).
• Penalised customers: those who exceed βi,kci,k.
PRA first tries to reduce the demanded power of the penalised customers
to lower them to either reach a value under βi,k otherwise the PSk,t is satu-
rated (reaches 0). After attending penalised receivers, if there is still power
sharing available (PSk,t > 0), then all the givers are treated according to the
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Algorithm 1 Power Re-Allocation
Input: power profiles pi,k,t and contracted powers ci,k
1: for k ← 1 to NP do
2: for t← 1 to W
NP
do
3: if any customer pi,k,t exceeds its target power τi,k then
4: if ADPk,t < APRk,t then
5: Re-allocate power from those that exceed τi,k to those that do not
6: else if PSk,t > 0 then
7: Re-allocate power from those customers that pi,k,t > βi,kci,k until PSk,t = 0 or pi,k,t =
βi,kci,k to those that pi,k,t < τi,k
8: Re-allocate power from those customers that exceed the target power tpi,k to those that
do not until PSk,t = 0
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
re-allocation strategy to lower their demanded power as much as possible.
The power re-allocation algorithm is summarised at Algorithm 1.
If we consider that two profiles are complementary if when one exceeds its
contracted power, the other is below αi,kci,k. Then we can say that the more
complementary the demand profiles of the consumers are, the greater sav-
ings that PRA could achieve. Some examples of complementary profiles could
be residential buildings with commercial or office buildings. However, even
when demand profiles are very similar, PRA can achieve important benefits
because it is scarcely possible that mi,k of each customer along the time win-
dow (i.e. a month) will correspond to the same time t. Besides, this method
is not constrained to a maximum number of consumers, however, the addi-
tion of non-complementary consumers to a given coalition using PRA may
reduce the individual savings but never the absolute global savings. Further-
more, this methodology is applicable to any kind of consumer which have
a electricity billing depending on its maximum demanded power by using
maximeters. Nevertheless, such kind of electricity bills is usually reserved to
consumers with a contracted power greater than 15kW (when maximeters are
mandatory) while domestic contracted power is usually smaller than 5kW.
Therefore, this excludes, for the time being, multi-family buildings with no
centralised consumption accounting. However, the generalisation of smart
meters, capable to measure the maximum demanded power, may change this
fact.
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4.4. Target power setting step
Target power τi,k is initially set to αi,kci,k, and it is adjusted iteration after
iteration. That is, after a PRA iteration, it calculates the new maximum
demanded power m′i,k for each consumer. If PRA does not achieve the ideal
situation, in which all customers m′i,k ≤ τi,k, those which m′i,k > τi,k will
be charged for the m′i,k for all of period k. Therefore, τi,k is shifted closer
to the new maximum, in order to increase the power sharing for the whole
community. Notice that this does not increase mi,k and thus neither the
payment.
In order to modify τi,k, we need to take into account that some other
customers could be in a similar situation. If they are requiring power in the
same t, we can think of modifying τi,k according to the new m
′
i,k value; but
if their needs correspond to different t, a small increase in several customers
could be enough to cover most of their needs. Therefore, we adjust τi,k
according to the second maximum as follows:
τni,k = max
(
αi,kci,k, max
∀t|pi,k,t<maxt(pi,k,t)
(pi,k,t)
)
(10)
Observe, that the first iteration is equivalent to τ 1i,k = max (αi,kci,k, 0).
Going back to the example of Figure 3 and Subsection 4.1, the payment
corresponding to each consumer using PRA would be:
• Consumer 1: 112.5e
– Period 1: 40e, since its final power profile at k = 3 would be
p1,1,t = [20, 40, 36] with 0.85 ∗ 40 = 34 < m1,1 = 40 < 1.05 ∗ 40 =
42.
– Period 2: 45e, since there is no power re-allocation because both
peak power are at the same time and both exceed 0.85∗50 = 42.5.
– Period 3: 27.5e, since its final power profile at k = 3 would be
p1,3,t = [27.5, 27.5, 27.5] with 0.85 ∗ 30 = 25.5 < m1,3 = 27.5 <
1.05 ∗ 30 = 31.5.
• Consumer 2: 141.5e
– Period 1: 39e, since its final power profile at k = 3 would be
p2,1,t = [35, 39, 39] with 0.85 ∗ 40 = 34 < m2,1 = 39 < 1.05 ∗ 39 =
42.
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– Period 2: 75e, since there is no power re-allocation because both
peak power are at the same time and both exceed 0.85∗50 = 42.5.
– Period 3: 27.5e, since its final power profile at k = 3 would be
p2,3,t = [27.5, 27.5, 27.5] with 0.85 ∗ 30 = 25.5 < m2,3 = 27.5 <
1.05 ∗ 30 = 31.5.
It is worth to point out that power re-allocation at periods 1 and 3 is
possible thanks to re-set the target power of each consumer. Furthermore, the
total amount to pay by the two consumers rises to 254e which is more than
the 238e of the umbrella entity. This fact is caused because no consumer has
to pay more than running alone and so we limit power re-allocation. Then,
in some situations there would be a surplus of money between the amount
paid by the consumers respect the money paid by the umbrella entity which
will have an extra income.
4.5. Re-allocation strategies
The distribution of power among givers and receivers can be performed
following different strategies. The simple one is a proportional strategy;
other strategies could take advantage of the exchange history. Along the
PRA application, customers change their role from givers to receivers and
vice versa according to their profiles and the APR. Therefore, it is possible to
keep the history of each customer, and register how many times customers
have received power from others. Fair strategies can use a priority model
to prioritise customers that have often received power over other customers
when they require to give power.
4.5.1. Proportional re-allocation
The power each receiver gets is proportional to the difference between
its target power and its maximum demanded power. For example, consider
that we have three customers with the same target power of 50kW and their
demanded powers at time t are 41kW, 44kW and 60kW. So, the third cus-
tomer gives 6kW to the first customer (and then, its demanded power would
be 47kW) and 4kW to the second customer (and then, its demanded power
would be 48kW).
Consider a second example in which there is not enough power sharing,
where the three customers have the same target power equal to 50kW and the
same βi,kci,k = 60. Their respective demanded powers at time t are 40kW,
55kW and 65kW. The latter customer is greater than βi,kci,k and so it would
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be penalised. Thus, PRA re-allocates the power of this customer to the re-
ceiver converting their consumptions to 60kW and 45kW respectively. Since,
there is still power sharing available it re-allocates again the power of all
customers exceeding their target power to receivers, until PSi,k is saturated.
Then the three corresponding demanded powers would be 50kW (receiver),
53.33kW and 56.67kW. Givers give an amount of power proportional to the
difference between their demanded power and their target power.
4.5.2. Received Frequency Priority (RFP)
Along the PRA application, customers change their role from givers to
receivers and vice versa, according to their profiles and the APR. Therefore,
it is possible to keep the history of each customer, and register how many
times customers have received power from others. This strategy prioritises
customers that have often received power over other customers, when they
are required to give power.
Priority is defined in [0, 1], where 0 represents the lowest priority and 1
the greatest.
Moreover, since power has different prices in different slots, it could be
convenient to distinguish a priority per customer and period, priorityi,k.
Given the time window W in which PRA is applied, there are up to W/Np
times that the same slot has been considered. On the other hand, we can
define xi,k as the number of times it has received power from others in slot
k. Then, the priority of each customer is calculated according to Equation
(11).
priorityi,k =
xi,k
W/NP
(11)
4.5.3. Received Amount Priority (RAP)
The aim of this method is to focus on the amount of energy received in
the past, instead of the frequency. To this end, we need to be aware of the
maximum capacity that any customer can receive, i.e, αi,jci.
We define zi,k,t as the amount of power that customer i has received
from others, at instance t in period k. Consistently, priorities are calculated
according to Equation (12).
priorityi,k =
∑W/NP
t=1 zi,k,t/ (αi,kci)
W/NP
(12)
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Priorities can also be set according to customer types or according to
other strategies that can be studied in further work.
5. Experimentation
In this section we first explain the experimental setup over which we
conducted the experimentation. Then we study and analyse the performance
of the methodology and reallocation strategies presented in this paper.
5.1. Experimental set up
The data on which we conducted our experiment is based on the real
electric energy consumptions of eight business buildings (office and teaching
buildings of the University of Girona) (Nc = 8). We analysed the data in
order to estimate the probability distributions of the power consumptions
in a day (differentiating between workdays and vacations/weekend)2. From
that distribution, we get the pi,k,t of each consumer. Figure 5 shows the box
plot of the demanded power of each customer on workdays. We set Np = 3
because this is the current number of periods of the Spanish model.
We set the contracted power of each customer (ci,k) to the optimal one,
which can be obtained since we know all the historical information of the
simulated companies. That is, for each period k, it is possible to know what
is the maximum demanded power of a consumer, and then, assign that as the
contracted power, meaning than the derived cost will be the best according
to Equation 3. Of course, this is the optimal power regarding the consumers
work in isolation; we expect to improve this value when consumers work in
coalition. Dealing with the optimal contracted power ensures that the results
of the different methods are comparable. Regarding the αi, k and βi,k, they
have been set to 0.85 and 1.05 correspondingly.
Regarding power prices, we considered three different periods for all cus-
tomers and the same prices for each customer: 3.31 e/kW for k = 1, 1.98
e/kW for k = 2 and 1.32 e/kW for k = 3. These prices have been taken
from current companies bills.
In order to analyse PRA and the reallocations strategies, we conducted
experimentation over two different scenarios:
2Probability density functions available at http://eia.udg.es/˜ftorrent/powerProfiles.pdf
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• Scenario 1: Analysis and comparison of costs regarding the benefits of
using PRA. To this end, three configurations are considered,
– no-PRA: the consumers manage power by themselves
– Aggregation: an unconstrained umbrella entity which pays for all
of the consumers, and proportionally shares the power.
– PRA: an umbrella entity with PRA using the proportional strat-
egy
Simulations are run for one month of the electric consumption of each
customer. Our hypothesis is that either the use of PRA or the ag-
gregation will convey a reduction of the cost compared with no-PRA.
Moreover, with PRA, consumers are guaranteed that will never pay
more than alone.
• Scenario 2: in this second scenario we study the implications of using
different reallocation strategies. We conducted experimentation for one
simulated year because one month is a too short period of time to
achieve significant differences concerning the amount of power or how
many times customers receive power from others. In addition to the
RAP, the RFP and the proportional priority strategy we defined a
random priority strategy. We expect that RAP and RFP will behave
better than the random and proportional strategy.
5.2. Results and Discussion
Results are analysed on the basis of the following measures:
• Global costs (e): the sum of the power costs of all customers according
to Equation (2), ∑
i,k
cost(mi,k) (13)
• Customer costs (e): the sum of the power costs for a customer i inside
a time window, ∑
k
cost(mi,k) (14)
21
050
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 1
0
100
200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 2
0
50
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 3
0
50
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 4
0
200
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 5
0
100
200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 6
0
100
200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 7
0
50
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Customer 8
Figure 5: Box plots of the demanded power of each customer along workdays.
• Final power profile (kW): the power required by a particular customer
i as a result of the method (final pi)
• Gini coefficient: to evaluate the fairness of each strategy, we used the
Gini coefficient [4] taking as wealth the savings of each customer, and as
size of the population the mean power that each customer receives from
others. Thus we calculate the Gini coefficient, weighting the saving of
each customer by the power it has received from others. This means
that the index is a measure of fairness regarding the benefits of each
customer with to respect how useful it has been to the other customers.
Results are provided in average after 100 repetitions of the simulations.
Scenario 1: Benefits of using PRA. As a first example, Figure 6 shows the
target power of four customers (τi,k) and the final power profile of each one
along a day when using PRA and when not3. Figure 6 shows how demanded
power for those customers that exceed their contracted power, is re-allocated
3At t = 20 the other customers give or receive small amounts of power and we do not
show them.
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Figure 6: Power profiles along a day of four customers using PRA and without PRA
compared with the target power of each one (flat line)
to other customers. For example, at t = 20 customers one and seven demand
a power of 61kW and 113kW. If no re-allocation is performed, demanded
power will exceed contracted power (and target power); but when using PRA,
they can reduce demanded power to 47kW and 96kW respectively, which
keeps them below their power target. On the other hand, customers four
and six have a demanded power of 11kW and 35kW respectively, but after
re-allocation their demanded power increases to 19kW and 57kW. Therefore,
PRA follows a peak shaving and valley filling strategy for the power required
by each customer but it does not change the overall demand.
Note that customers that receive power from others never surpass their
target power and therefore they do not increase their own power costs.
Figure 7 shows the global costs of eight customers with their optimal
contracted power (x=1.0), and other costs resulting from adjusting the con-
tracted power upwards (1.05*optimal power, 1.10 * optimal power, ...) and
downwards (0.95 *optimal power, ...). Figure 7 shows that in general, us-
ing PRA or the aggregation configuration achieves a great reduction in the
cost of the whole demand, with respect to the case where each customer has
its own contracted power and there is not a re-allocation of the demanded
power (non-PRA). Comparing PRA with the aggregation configuration, we
see that as expected, the aggregation obtains the minimum possible cost for
each possible contracted power. However, when customers have their opti-
mal contracted power for their demand, the difference between PRA and the
aggregation is negligible (5.1 ·103 and 5.05 ·103 correspondingly). That point
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means that PRA is able to achieve the minimal possible cost when customers
have their optimal contracted power. In other situations, it is important to
note that the aggregation does not guarantee that the consumer will pay less
than in an individual way, whereas PRA does.
Focusing on each customer, Figure 8 shows the cost each customer would
pay for each method (PRA, no-PRA and aggregation). We see that PRA
guarantees that any customer will not increase its cost while aggregating
the demands does not guarantee it. For example, customers five and seven
achieve their lowest cost when PRA is used. The cost reduction for each
customer goes from 14.63% (customer five) to 24.29% (customer eight). Thus
each customer achieves an important reduction of the cost.
It is worth pointing out that PRA has been tested with eight different
customers that share a similar power profile (the highest peaks are approx-
imately at the same time each day, and they have vacations, valleys, at the
same time). However PRA is more effective if profiles are complementary
(peaks of one customer correspond to a valley of another). Even in such
conditions the cost of reduction is very important, around 20% in average.
Thus the savings achieved by PRA may be an incentive for industrial parks
or other communities of customers to tend to complementary profiles.
Results in Figure 7 also show that PRA becomes useless when the con-
tracted power of each customer is sufficiently high (worse case for x=1.50 of
the optimal contracted power) and no re-allocation is needed. It also shows a
trend indicating that for very low contracted powers (worse case for x=0.50 of
the optimal contracted power) the cost increases and tends to be equal to the
cost with No-PRA. This is because most of the time the customers’ demands
exceed their contracted power, and power re-allocation is not possible.
The main benefit of PRA comes from the fact that it returns information
regarding the possibility of reducing contracted power. From Figure 7 we
see that the cost curve reaches the minimum when using PRA at x=0.80,
meaning, that all customers could propose a new contract power for that
value to the company. Comparing the minimum No-PRA cost with the min-
imum PRA cost, we see that there is a 20% reduction. In the real case under
study, this means a saving of around 1300e per month for the overall cost.
The investment and costs required for our methodology is the implantation
of smart meters (300e per unit) to all consumers (which are currently being
implanted in many countries) and additional one for the umbrella entity to
be able to measure the aggregated consumption. The cost of managing the
umbrella entity we think is negligible if it is managed by an electricity trade
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Figure 7: Average and standard deviation of the sum of power costs of all customers
modifying all ci,k proportionally respect the contracted power, c
o
i,k, that minimizes PRA
power costs.
company. Given these costs and these experimental results we can say that
the benefits of using PRA widely surpass its costs.
On the other hand, the reduction of the contracted power not only benefits
consumers, but also electricity companies. When a consumer has a particular
contracted power, the electricity distribution company has the duty to satisfy
a power demand of this value at any time. Thus, an increase of the contracted
power by the consumers (or an increase of the number of consumers) conveys
an adjustment of the grid, even if this grid is underutilised most of the
time. In this sense, a reduction of the contracted power by the consumers,
without reducing the demand, increases the utilisation of the grid, benefiting
electricity companies because they can make the most of their infrastructure.
Scenario 2: Priority trade-off. Experimentation with Scenario 2 showed us
that global costs do not depend on the priority strategy used. This was an
expected result because the priority strategies are only used to decide the
amount of energy each customer can give when it is impossible to keep all
of them below their target power. Thus, we think it is important to have a
strategy that guarantees some fairness, not in terms of equity, but in terms
of benefiting those customers that are active receivers.
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Figure 9 shows the Gini coefficient (the mean and the standard deviation)
achieved by each priority strategy. It shows that the use of RFP or RAP
reduces the Gini coefficient. Since we are calculating the Gini index, taking
as the wealth the relative savings of each consumer, and the size of each
population as the amount of received power by each customer, the index
indicates the fairness of each strategy. According to this index a fair strategy
is the one that provides, each consumer with a relative saving proportional
to the amount of received power. In this way, Figure 9 shows that RFP and
RAP strategies are fairer than the others. Particularly, RAP is the fairest
strategy.
We have also computed paired-response (with a significance level of 5%)
tests of the Gini indices with 100 repetitions of the experiment and these tests
show that the RAP strategy does achieve the lower Gini index, followed by
RFP. Pair-response tests also conclude that using random priorities performs
worse than using the proportional method.
6. Conclusions and future work
Electricity companies invoice their customers with their maximum power
demand peak and, depending on whether such a peak exceeds their con-
tracted power, penalising their consumers with extra charges. This paper
presents a method for re-allocating the power demand by a coalition of con-
sumers, in order to avoid extra charges due to the demanded power as well as
the contracted power. In doing so, we avoid an exchange of money between
the consumers and guarantee that no consumer will have a greater cost due
to such power re-allocation. This methodology needs a (virtual) umbrella
entity that groups consumers and carries out power re-allocation.
The paper presents some priority strategies in order to benefit those con-
sumers that accept receiving demanded power from others. In this way, we
propose a method that uses solidarity among consumers to reduce power
costs but includes strategies of fairness that guarantee that no consumer will
be charged for an excess of demand of another consumer, and that those that
accept more power from others will be treated in a preferential way.
Finally we analysed the performance of the methodology presented in the
paper using the real-based simulated consumptions of eight buildings. The
results showed that re-allocation reduces power costs by about 20% (sur-
passing the costs of carrying it out) and allows a reduction of the contracted
power by the consumers without increasing penalties. This latter result is
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also positive for electricity companies because it would help to increase the
utilisation index of the grid, because consumers would be able to reduce their
contracted power without increasing penalties for exceeding it, and thus, the
power grid will be able to accept more consumers (in an increasing electricity
demand scenario) without extra investments. Then, a generalised reduction
of the contracted powers, besides increasing the network usage, may involve
a reduction of active and installed generators, reducing human pressure to
Earth resources.
It is important to point out that the more different the demand profiles
of the consumers are, the greater savings that PRA will achieve. However,
even when demand profiles are very similar, PRA can achieve important
benefits because it is scarcely possible that maximum electricity demand of
each customer along the time window (i.e. a month) corresponds to the same
time. Nevertheless, a future research should be guided towards quantifying
how many buildings or industries of each kind of power profile would be the
optimum, as well as, mapping power profiles and the power grid using geo-
graphic information systems to work out the areas with a greatest potential
benefit for using power re-allocation. Furthermore, this information could
be used for local energy and land use planning in order to flatten aggregated
power profiles by placing complementary consumers close to each other and
hanging from the same line of the power grid.
Regarding the improvement of the methodology, there are interesting lines
of research as the study of other priority strategies or the implications of the
cold start and the arrival of new customers.
Acknowledgements
This research project has been partially funded through BR-UdG Schol-
arship of the University of Girona granted to Ferran Torrent-Fontbona. Work
developed with the support of the research group SITES awarded with dis-
tinction by the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR 2014-2016) and the MESC
project funded by the Spanish MINECO (Ref. DPI2013-47450-C2-1-R).
References
[1] Bakari, K. E., & Kling, W. L. (2010). Virtual power plants: An answer to
increasing distributed generation. In 2010 IEEE PES Innovative Smart
Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT Europe) (pp. 1–6).
28
[2] Brounen, D., Kok, N., & Quigley, J. M. (2013). Energy literacy, aware-
ness, and conservation behavior of residential households. Energy Eco-
nomics , 38 , 42–50.
[3] Faria, P., Vale, Z., Soares, J., & Ferreira, J. (2011). Demand response
management in power systems using a particle swarm optimization ap-
proach. IEEE Intelligent Systems , 28 , 43–51.
[4] Gastwirth, J. (1972). The estimation of the Lorenz curve and Gini index.
The Review of Economics and Statistics , 54 , 306–316.
[5] Gottwalt, S., Ketter, W., Block, C., Collins, J., & Weinhardt, C. (2011).
Demand side management - A simulation of household behavior under
variable prices. Energy Policy , 39 , 8163–8174.
[6] Jia, W., Kang, C., & Chen, Q. (2012). Analysis on demand-side in-
teractive response capability for power system dispatch in a smart grid
framework. Electric Power Systems Research, 90 , 11–17.
[7] Ketter, W., Collins, J., & Reddy, P. (2013). Power TAC: A Competitive
Economic Simulation of the Smart Grid. Energy Economics , 39 , 262–
270.
[8] Kwag, H.-G., Kim, Y.-H., & Kim, J.-O. (2012). Virtual peak plant
concepts of Demand Response. In Systems and Informatics (ICSAI),
2012 International Conference on (pp. 614–618).
[9] Law, Y. W., Alpcan, T., Lee, V., Lo, A., Marusic, S., & Palaniswami,
M. (2012). Demand response architectures and load management algo-
rithms for energy-efficient power grids: a survey. In Knowledge, Infor-
mation and Creativity Support Systems (KICSS), 2012 Seventh Inter-
national Conference on (pp. 134–141).
[10] Leng, M., Parlar, M., & Zhang, D. (2014). Cooperative game analy-
sis of retail space-exchange problems. European Journal of Operational
Research, 232 , 393–404.
[11] Meir, I.A. & Pearlmutter, D. (2010). Building for climate change: plan-
ning and design considerations in time of climatic uncertainty. Corrosion
Engineering Science and Technology , 45 , 70–75.
29
[12] Meir, I.A., Peeters, A., Pearlmutter, D., Halassa, S., Garb, Y.,& Davis,
J.M. (2012). Green building standards in MENA: An assessment of
regional constraints, needs and trends. Journal Advances in Building
Energy Research, 6 , 173–211.
[13] Mohsenian-Rad, A.-H., Wong, V. W. S., Jatskevich, J., Schober, R.,
& Leon-Garcia, A. (2010). Autonomous Demand-Side Management
Based on Game-Theoretic Energy Consumption Scheduling for the Fu-
ture Smart Grid. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid , 1 , 320–331.
[14] Pudjianto, D., Ramsay, C., & Strbac, G. (2007). Virtual power plant
and system integration of distributed energy resources. Renewable power
generation, IET , 1 , 10–16.
[15] Simonis, H., & Hadzic, T. (2011). A Resource Cost Aware Cumulative.
In J. Larrosa, & B. O’Sullivan (Eds.), Recent Advances in Constraints
ecent Advances in Constraints (pp. 76–89). Heidelberg: Springer Berlin.
(Lecture no ed.).
[16] Torrent-Fontbona, F., & Lo´pez, B. (2013). Comparison of Workflow
Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions Research Report
13-01-RR. Technical Report March Institute of Informatics and Appli-
cations, University of Girona Girona.
[17] Vinyals, M., Bistaffa, F., & Rogers, A. (2012). Stable coalition forma-
tion among energy consumers in the smart grid. In Proceedings of the
3rd International Workshop on Agent Technologies for Energy Systems
(ATES 2012) i. Valencia.
[18] Zhang, Z., Kusiak, A., & Song, Z. (2013). Scheduling electric power
production at a wind farm. European Journal of Operational Research,
224 , 227–238.
30
